The criminal responsibility of a commander or superior is known as the center of gravity and backbone of international criminal law. Although in the past, commanders were not questioned for the crimes committed by their subordinates, this practice changed after the world wars and commanders were considered responsible for the actions of their subordinates. Responsibility is not limited to military officials, but all military or civilian persons who formally or informally have effective power and control over the actions of their subordinates are responsible for the crimes committed. In this article, compiled using a descriptive-analytical method, the nature and elements of criminal responsibility in international criminal law are explained. The following is an analysis of these opinions, while referring to the official opinions of the International Criminal Court in the Congo situation. Despite the trial chamber’s verdict, in the final verdict issued by the Appeals Chamber, five judges of this chamber overturned the trial chamber’s verdict by a majority of three to two. The Appeals Chamber’s verdict in this regard reflects the difference in views regarding the nature and elements of command responsibility. Various interpretations have been presented in this case, with negligence at one end of the interpretative spectrum and intentional error at the other. From the lack of necessity to establish a causal relationship between the commander’s error and the commission of a crime by subordinates to the sufficiency of the “high probability” condition, this has led to the presentation of very diverse standards and criteria regard