Economic crimes committed by foreign investors in Iran—particularly in areas such as money laundering and sanctions violations—lie at a complex intersection of domestic law, international obligations, and macroeconomic considerations. The issue is not merely a conflict of jurisdictional rules; rather, it reflects a deeper normative crisis in which the traditional efficiency of judicial sovereignty weakens in the face of transnational criminal networks. This study, through an analytical and critical approach, reveals that the prevailing challenges stem less from legislative gaps and more from a structural inconsistency between the isolation induced by sanctions and the aspiration for integration into the global economy. This contradiction has led to duality and inertia in both lawmaking and enforcement processes, causing anti–money laundering regulations at times to function as instruments of capital control rather than economic transparency. On the jurisdictional level, fragmentation among general courts, revolutionary courts, and financial oversight bodies has created institutional disjunction, as each perceives only part of the overall problem. The absence of a cross-sector judicial body empowered to address complex economic crimes constitutes the most significant operational obstacle. Legislatively, ambiguity in defining “sanctions violations” has compelled judges to rely on broad interpretive principles such as “disruption of the national economic system,” resulting in inconsistent jurisprudence. Overcoming this impasse requires a fundamental redefinition of economic criminal policy and the establishment of an integrated judicial institution so that legal security and investment security are regarded as complementary pillars of national development.